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WHEN IS A PERFORMANCE NOT A PERFORMANCE?TWENTIETH CENTURY MUSIC CORP. v. AIKEN AND
ITS CATV PRECEDENTS
INTRODUCTION

The development of new technologies in communications has
placed a severe strain upon the provisions of the Copyright Act of
1909. Narrowly envisioned for a world just beginning to experience
the enormous impact of mechanical and electronic aids to communication, the Act has undergone only piecemeal revision since its inception. The underlying assumptions of the statute are out of date, not
only in an abstract conceptual way, but also in the practical sense of
being unenlightened by the everyday realities of the new media. As a
consequence of the staleness of the Act and of its original conceptual
inadequacy even in light of the technology of 1909, the courts have
been relied upon heavily to make adjustments between provisions of
the law and modem technological reality. In the process, the courts
have been more responsive to new developments than have either
Congress or the Federal Communications Commission.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken1 marks the end of a trilogy of decisions, begun by Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists2 and continued by Teleprompter Corp.
v. CBS," in which the courts, pressured by inactivity on the part of
Congress, have felt it necessary to redefine substantially the word "perform," as it is used in the copyright statute. The purpose of this Comment is to trace this development and to seek out its roots in the provisions of the copyright law itself.
I. THE RADIo CASES
A. The Classic Interpretation of "Perform": Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
Realty Co.
Section 5 of the Copyright Act of 1909 lists the classifications
under which works may be registered for federal copyright protection.
In pertinent part, it provides:
The application for registration shall specify to which of the following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
(c) lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery);
1. 95 S. Ct. 2040 (1975).
2. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
3. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
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(d) dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions;
(e) musical compositions;
4

Section 1 details which exclusive rights may be claimed by the
owner of copyright in a given class of work, including performance
rights:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of
this title, shall have the exclusive right:
(c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the
copyrighted work in public for profit if it be a lecture,
sermon, address or similar production, or other nondramatic
literary work; . . . and to play or perform it in public
for profit ....
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if
it be a drama ....
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be
a musical composition; .... r

The radio case which authoritatively interpreted the statutory
right to "perform" was decided by the Supreme Court in 1931 in Buck
v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co." Defendant LaSalle Hotel of Kansas City
maintained a master receiving set which was wired to each of the public
and private rooms in the hotel. Loud speakers or head phones were
provided in each room so that the program received on the master set
could, if desired, be heard simultaneously in each room throughout
the building. Part of one broadcast received by the hotel was thecopyrighted song, "Just Imagine." Suit was brought by the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), on behalf of
the copyright owner, alleging that his exclusive right to perform under
section 1(e) had been infringed. The Supreme Court found that the
hotel had, indeed, "performed" the copyrighted work, and thus that the
copyright owner's right to perform had been infringed. Together with
a brief discussion of the general theory of radio transmission, Justice
Brandeis concluded as follows:
We are satisfied that the reception of a radio broadcast and its translation into audible sound is not a mere audition of the original program. It is essentially a reproduction. . . . The transmitted radio
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 5(c),(d),(e) (1970).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(c),(d),(e) (1970).
6. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
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waves require a receiving set for their detection and translation into
audible sound waves, just as the record requires another mechanism
. . . Reproduction
for the reproduction of a recorded composition.
7
in both cases amounts to a performance.
-By the terms "reception" and "translation," the Court recognized that
the hotel's apparatus served a dual function; it not only received the
program but also acted upon it in such a way that the program was
audible in places where it otherwise would not have been. The Court

reasoned as follows:"
(1) "Reception" plus "translation" is not a "mere audition"; it is
essentially a "reproduction."
(2) "Reproduction," in turn, "amounts to a performance."

*Thus, the concept of "performance" can be seen as having been tied
together by the Court with the making-audible, "translation," or sending function of the hotel's radio device. The Court grasped precisely
the most basic features of radio transmission and introduced analytical
,concepts which would be applicable to any communications system.
To illustrate, it is instructive to break communication down into
very simple functional levels which are concordant with the Court's
-analysis. At base, communication may be described as follows:
Sender -

medium - Receiver
Example 1

If there are just two people in a room together, the Sender is the person who speaks, setting up vibrations which are carried through the
medium of air, and the Receiver is the one who picks up the vibrations and by means of his ear and nervous system understands what
the Speaker has said. In addition, even at this elementary level, each
of the two persons might act as a Conversion Device, a role which
combines the functions of Sender and Receiver. For example, if the
first person reads to the second, the transaction may be analyzed thus:
Conversion Device
(Receiving plus Sending)
Example 2
The first person receives visual input (the printing in the book), and
converts it into audible output (speaking) which travels through the
7. Id. at 199-201 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
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medium of air. The second person receives the vibrations and understands what the first has said. Likewise, the second person could perform the dual role of Receiver-Sender if, for example, he then told a
third person what he had just been told by the first, or if he wrote
down what he had just heard. If it is music, rather than words that
are being communicated, the analysis is exactly the same. The first
person receives the visual input (the printed score) and converts it
into audible output (singing, for example) which travels through the
medium of air. The second person receives the vibrations and hears
what the first has sung. The first person's act is referred to in everyday
language as "performing." In the foregoing communications system
analysis, as well as in the Court's opinion in Jewell-LaSalle, it is the
"sending" function which equals "performance." The singer would
not infringe the score simply by studying it, that is, just by receiving
it, but only by "sending" it to the listener through the act of "performing" in public for profit.
No matter how electronically sophisticated the devices used at any
point in the communications chain, the basic model does not change;
it only multiplies. Whenever an electronic device is inserted somewhere in the chain, it serves as both a Receiver and a Sender. For
example, the chain in Jewell-LaSalle could be schematized in the
following manner:
(1) Musical Score
("Just Imagine")
(original copyrighted artifact)
(2) Medium (air)
(3) Person Sings
(Conversion Device)
(Receiver plus Sender)
Medium
(air)
(4)
(5) Recording Microphone
(Conversion Device)
(Receiver plus Sender)
(6) Medium (wires)
(7) Tape or Disc
(Conversion Device)
(Receiver plus Sender)
(8) Medium (electronic)
(9) Record Player or Tape Deck
Exam

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)

(Conversion Device)
(Receiver plus Sender)
Medium (wires)
Transmitter
(Conversion Device)
(Receiver plus Sender)
Medium (air)
Radio Receiver
(Conversion Device)
(Receiver plus Sender)
Medium (wires)
Loudspeakers/Headphones
(Conversion Devices)
(Receiver plus Sender)
Medium (air)
Ultimate Listener
(Receiver)
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In Jewell-LaSalle, the links in this chain that were held to constitute
"performing" were numbers 13 to 17. More specifically, it was the use
of Link No. 13, the Radio Receiver, as not only a Receiver but also
a Sender, that the Court found objectionable. The reception was not
a "mere audition," but "essentially a reproduction" which "amounts
to a performance." 9 In the same passage of the opinion, the Court
noted that Link No. 9 also was a "performance" for the same reason.'0
Thus, the Court pointed out that Link No. 13, the Radio Receiver,
and Link No. 9, the Record Player, both served as conversion devices.
The "sending" or "reproduction" function served by each constituted
"performing." Thus, for the Jewell-LaSalle Court, the critical issue
was what function the individual device served. If it was a "sending"
'function, the device then "performed."
From this analysis, it follows that the traditional understanding
of the statutory word "perform" has revolved primarily around one of
two phenomena: (1) the conversion of communication from one sensory medium to another (in terms of music, most commonly from
sight to sound), or (2) the expansion in space and time of the range
over which a given communication can be accomplished. Point No.
I is obvious; changing the visible score into sounding music is the
everyday understanding of the word "perform." Point No. 2 arises
when technology can communicate the live performance beyond the
range over which it would have been heard without technological aids.
Thus, the recording of a live performance on disc allows that initial
performance to be heard wherever and whenever the disc is available.
The recording thus expands in time and space the range over which
the initial communication, the live performance, can be accomplished.
Therefore, as the Jewell-LaSalle Court pointed out, playing a record
is a "performance." Commercial broadcasting expands the range of
the initial live performance even beyond the scope of a single record.
Hence, commercial broadcasting also constitutes "performance." The
final expansion considered by Jewell-LaSalle was extending the range
of a commercial broadcast by means of a private speaker system. That
final expansion was likewise held to be a "performance." With respect
to both of these understandings of the term "perform"-sensory conversion and time/space expansion-it is the history of technological
development which has given the word its legal meaning. For with
each new technological development through which the sound of the
9. Id.
10. Id.
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original "performance," the sensory conversion, could be expanded in
space or time, the question could ultimately arise, "Does this expansion constitute a performance?"
B. "Performing"Held Not To Be "Performing":Aiken
The most recent Supreme Court case interpreting section l(e)
of the Copyright Act arose from facts exactly analogous to those in
Jewell-LaSalle. In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken," respondent owned and operated "George Aiken's Chicken," a fast-food
shop in downtown Pittsburgh which served both "carry-out" and "sitdown" customers12s Inside the store, a radio, with outlets to four
speakers in the ceiling, operated throughout the working day. Thus
Aiken, his employees, and his customers could hear the entire progTamming of the station to which the radio was tuned-music, news,
entertainment, and commercial advertising. One day, the broadcasts
of two copyrighted songs, "The More I See You," and "Me and My
Shadow," were received from a local station while several customers
were in the establishment. Petitioners Twentieth Century Music and
Mary Bourne, owners of copyright in the two songs, respectively, instituted suit in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. They alleged that the reception in Aiken's restaurant of the
licensed broadcasts infringed upon their exclusive rights under the
federal law to perform their works in public for profit. The district
judge ruled that infringement had occurred and granted statutory
money damages for each violation.13 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed that judgment, finding no infringement, 14 and the
Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's reversal.
As already noted, 5 section l(e) of the Copyright Act gives the
owner of copyright in a musical score the exclusive right "to perform"
the piece "publicly for profit." Thus, "performance" and "publicly for
profit" are the two elements necessary for a finding of "infringement."
The dispositive question in Aiken, as phrased by Justice Stewart, was
"whether this radio reception constituted a 'performance' of the copyrighted works."' 16 The question was so stated because decisional prece11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

95 S. Ct. 2040 (1975).
Id. at 2042.
356 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974).
See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra.
95 S. Ct. at 2044.
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dent, as provided by Herbert v. Shanley,17 clearly indicated that the
radio reception of a musical piece as had occurred in the Aiken situation constituted activity done "publicly for profit." Thus, one half
of the test for infringement was already satisfied and not at issue; only
the performance question remained as a potential bar to Aiken's
liability.
In positing the Aiken performance question, Justice Stewart used
exactly the same shorthand language that the Jewell-LaSalle Court had
used in describing the activity it had held to be infringing. The question certified in the earlier case was whether "making available...
the hearing" constituted a "performance."1 8 By the logic outlined
earlier,' 9 it was decided that a "reception" "translat[ed]" was a "reproduction," and the "reproduction" was a "performance."2 0 This
line of reasoning, when expressed without the intermediate steps in
the logic, resulted in the conclusion that "reception" is "performance '"
and a "public reception for profit" comprised an "infringement." The
Jewell-LaSalle Court stated this explicitly when it noted that "the
public reception for profit in itself constitutes an infringement." 2'
Based upon the Jewell-LaSalle precedent, then, Justice Stewart's critical
question in Aiken seemed clearly answerable in the affirmative. The
radio reception should have constituted a performance in the latter
case, just as it had in the earlier one. Nonetheless, while explicitly
17. 242 U.S. 591 (1917). In this case, it was held that the live performance of a
copyrighted musical composition in a restaurant or hotel without charge for admission
to hear it infringed the exclusive right of the owner of the copyright to perform the work
publicly for profit. The famous opinion by Justice Holmes summarizes the conclusion in
this colorful language:
The defendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They are part of a total
for which the public pays .... It is true that music is not the sole object, but

neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The object
is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited powers of conversation
or disliking the rival noise give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating
a silent meal.
242 U.S. at 594-95.
18. 283 U.S. 191, 195-96 (1931). The entire question presented by Justice Brandeis was: "Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his guests, through
the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and loud speakers installed in his hotel and
under his control and for the entertainment of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted
musical composition which has been broadcast from a radio transmitting station, constitute a performance of such composition within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e) ?"
19. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
20. 283 U.S. at 199-201.
21. Id. at 198. Always underlying this briefly stated version of the holding was, of
course, the more fully stated and more clearly understandable rationale that the reception had been "translated," or in the words of the certified question, "made available,"
and, in that form, constituted a performance. The reasoning, in either the short or the
long version, is applicable directly to the Aiken situation.
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not overruling Jewell-LaSalle, but simply confining it to its facts, the
Aiken Court found that Aiken's apparatus had not "performed."
Therefore, since the Aiken broadcast failed to meet one of the two
prerequisites for liability, it had not infringed copyright in the two
songs.
C. Does Aiken Overrule Jewell-LaSalle?
In concurring with the Aiken majority, Justice Blackmun nonetheless puzzled, "I cannot understand why the Court is so reluctant
to do directly what it obviously is doing indirectly, namely, to overrule
'22
Jewell-LaSalle."
To test the relationship of the two radio cases, it would be profitable to examine the effect of Jewell-LaSalle upon Aiken, had it been
applied directly rather than through Fortnightly and Teleprompter,
the two cable television "performance" cases which intervened.
In reaching its conclusion of infringement, the Jewell-LaSalle
Court had noted that "since the public reception for profit in itself
constitutes an infringement, we have no occasion to determine under
what circumstances a broadcaster will be held to be a performer, or
the effect upon others of his paying a license fee." 23 In Aiken, the
Supreme Court explicitly assumed that "the radio reception of the
musical compositions in Aiken's restaurant occurred 'publicly for
profit.'"24 Thus, Aiken's activities fell squarely within the description
of the LaSalle Hotel's unlawful "public reception for profit." The
only real question in Aiken, which had been left open by JewellLaSalle, was the effect of a license. And even on that issue the earlier
Court gave guidance by noting what it thought might be the significance of a license: "If the copyrighted composition had been broadcast
. . . with plaintiffs' consent, a license for its commercial reception and
distribution by the hotel company might possibly have been implied." 25
Thus, the earlier Court made clear that a license from the copyright
owner to the commercial broadcaster would not have affected its ruling
on the question of whether or not a "public reception for profit" had
occurred when the hotel received the broadcast and made it available
to its guests through speakers and headphones. Rather, the Court said
that a license given to the broadcaster would affect only the determina22.
23.
24.
25.

95 S. Ct. at 2049 (concurring opinion).
283 U.S. at 198.
95 S. Ct. at 2044.
283 U.S. at 199 n.5.
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tion of whether or not the copyright owner's consent to the hotel's
activity could be inferred. That is, a license might cause normally
infringing activity to be held non-infringing because from the commercial broadcaster's license, it might be inferred that the copyright
owner had impliedly given permission to the hotel commercially to
receive and distribute the broadcast.
Because Jewell-LaSalle determined that "the public reception for
profit in itself constitutes infringement," 26 establishments with installations similar to that in the Hotel LaSalle have had to protect themselves from suit by seeking licenses from copyright owners. To simplify
the process, ASCAP has been serving as a clearinghouse since 1941,
claiming now to have contracts with 5150 businesses resulting in
royalty payments of $246,000 annually.2 7 In so contracting, ASCAP
has sought to protect itself and the copyright owners against the consequences of licensing that had been suggested by the Jewell-LaSalle
Court by including in the contract a clause expressly negating any
implied license. Such a clause appeared in the contract made with
station WKJF-FM, Pittsburgh, which was the station that Aiken received in his shop.28 Since the Court admitted that Aiken had received
the radio broadcast publicly for profit, and since the ASCAP contract expressly negated the possibility that a license for Aiken's reception might be implied from WKJF's license, Aiken, under JewellLaSalle, should have been held liable for infringement. Justice Stewart
posed the Aiken question in the following terms, "[w]hether the reception of a radio broadcast of a copyrighted musical composition can
constitute copyright infringement, when the copyright owner has licensed the broadcaster to perform the composition publicly for
profit." 29 Under the authority of Jewell-LaSalle and the restrictive
26. Id. at 198.
27. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1974).
Thus, a business like the Hotel LaSalle would pay ASCAP a license fee, in return for
which the Hotel would be allowed to "perform" the works. ASCAP serves as a go.
between, so that the Hotel does not have to seek out and be licensed by each copyright
owner individually. For a discussion of ASCAP, see K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing
Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967).

28.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing Licensee [WKJFFM] to grant to others any right to reproduce or perform publicly for profit by
any means, method or process whatsoever any of the musical compositions
licensed hereunder or as authorizing any receiver of any radio broadcast to perform publicly or reproduce the same for profit, by any means, method or
process whatsoever.
95 S. Ct. at 2042 n.l.
29. Id. at 2042.
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clause of the ASCAP contract, the question should have been answered
in the affirmative. Since the Aiken Court did not find infringement,
Justice Blackmun was entirely correct in stating that Aiken, in effect,
overruled Jewell-LaSalle.8o
The Aiken Court avoided the implications of the earlier radio
case only by quoting it incompletely and out of context: "[W]e have
no occasion to determine under what circumstances a broadcaster will
be held to be a performer, or the effect upon others of his paying a
license fee." 81 The Court derived from this incomplete quotation an
implication that authorization by the copyright owner turns a "performance" into a "non-performance." This conclusion is inconsistent
with Jewell-LaSalle since the Jewell-LaSalle Court made it quite clear
that only when it has been determined that a "performance" has
occurred does the existence of a license become critical since it is pertinent to the issue of whether or not the performance is an infringing
one.
II. TH COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION (CATV) CASES
A.'Fortnightly and Teleprompter
It is apparent that the two CATV cases which were decided in
the interim between the two radio cases were crucial in turning the
"performance" of Jewell-LaSalle into the "non-performance" of Aiken.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists,8 2 petitioner Fortnightly Corporation operated cable television systems which provided customers
in mountainous Clarksburg and Fairmont, West Virginia, with signals
of five television stations from 52 to 82 miles away. Fortnightly neither
edited the programs of the five commercial stations nor originated any
programs of its own. Customers paid a flat monthly fee regardless of
the amount of time they chose to watch any of these five channels.
Respondent United Artists Television, Inc., had licensed each of the
five stations to broadcast motion pictures to which it held copyright.
In, the course of its normal service, Fortnightly carried these films on
30. Id. at 2048-49 (concurring opinion).
31. Id. at 2046 n.10 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added by the Aiken Court).
The entire quotation reads as follows:
And since the public reception for profit in itself constitutes an infringement,
we have no occasion to determine under what circumstances a broadcaster will
be held to be a performer, or the effects upon others of his paying a license fee.
283 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
32. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
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its CATV system without- obtaining a license under the copyrights.
Furthermore, the original licenses granted to the five stations did not
authorize carriage of the broadcasts by CATV systems, and, in'several
cases, the licenses specifically prohibited such carriage. Therefore,
United Artists charged infringement under 17 U.S.C., sections l(c)
and (d), of its exclusive rights to "'pe rf o r m ... in public for profit'
(nondramatic literary works)" and to "'perform .. .publicly' (dra33
matic works)."
In deciding for the respondent, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals formulated and applied a quantitative test based on JewellLaSalle, in which it asked, "[H]ow much did the defendant do to
bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work?' 3 4 Applying this test, the court found that the petitioner did "perform". the
programs carried by its systems. The Supreme Court reversed, however, and ruled that no infringement had occurred. Writing for the
5-1 majority, Justice Stewart rejected the idea that "mere quantitative contribution" was the "proper test. "3a Rather, the critical •issue
was held to be the function that CATV plays in the total processof
television broadcasting and reception. Justice Stewart concluded thatbroadcasters have been judicially treated as exhibitors, and viewers
as members of a theater audience. Broadcasters perform. Viewers
do not perform ....
framework, we conclude that
When CATV is considered in this
36
it falls on the viewer's side of the line.
In so articulating the new standard, Justice Stewart did not try to
reconcile it with the holding in Jewell-LaSalle. He merely mentioned
in a footnote that the earlier case had left open the question of'outcome when the original broadcast is licensed. As a result, he concluded, the earlier decision must be understood as limited to iti own
facts. But, as has been demonstrated earlier,37 the license issue is
irrelevant to determining whether or not a "performance" has taken
place. The assertion that this issue distinguished Fortnightly from
Jewell-LaSalle elicited a strong dissent from Justice Fortas, who be-lieved that Fortnightly flew in the face of the earlier case:
I believe this decision [Jewell-LaSalle] stands squarely in the path of
33. Id. at 395 (footnotes omitted).
34. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 877 (2d
Cir. 1967).

35. 392 U.S.-at 397.
36. Id. at 398-99 (footnotes omitted).
37. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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the route which the majority today traverses. If a CATV system
performs a function "little different from that served by the equipment generally furnished by a television viewer," and if that is to be
the test, then it seems to me that a master radio set attached by wire
to numerous other sets in various rooms of a hotel cannot be distinguished.38

The second cable television case, Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS89
was decided by the Supreme Court while Aiken was being appealed at
the circuit court level. The Teleprompter opinion played a central
role in causing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Aiken to reverse
the district court and hold that no infringement had occurred. The
Teleprompter facts were basically the same as those in Fortnightly,
with the exception of four technological developments which plaintiff

CBS cited as distinguishing their position from that of Fortnightly.
These developments included the following: (1) origination of programming on non-broadcast channels, and the sale of commercial time
on such non-broadcast programming; (2) interconnection with neighboring CATV systems; (3)use of microwave links in bringing broadcast programming to subscribers; and (4) the importation of distant
broadcast signals from outside the area served by the CATV system. 40
In response to the first contention, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
declared itself unable to see why a system's program origination on
channels other than those on which it relays broadcast programming
should alter the result reached in Fortnightly. It recognized that one
channel of a system might serve as viewer, while at the same time
another might serve as a broadcaster, and explicitly rejected an "unnecessarily wooden and mechanical .. .application of copyright law

to CATV." 41 In considering the significance of interconnections with
neighboring CATV systems, the court found that there had been only
two such joinings, both for sports events, both originating on nonbroadcast channels and unrelated to the reception of any of CBS's
copyrighted programs. Therefore, its present effect was negligible.
The court specifically reserved opinion on the effect of interconnection
if it ever reached the point of being equivalent to a network of CATV
systems.42 The microwave contention was deemed to be legally insignificant, being only an alternative and perhaps more economical
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 406 (footnote omitted).
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 346-47 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 348 (footnote omitted).

42. Id.

1976]

COPYRIGHT AND COMMUNICATION

way of transmitting a broadcast signal from one point in the system
to another.43 On the last issue, however, the court partially agreed with
plaintiff CBS. It found that when a CATV system is distributing
signals that are beyond the range of local antennas, "it is functionally
equivalent to a broadcaster and thus should be deemed to 'perform'"
the program. 44 This attitude is in harmony with the traditional understanding of "perform," as articulated in Jewell-LaSalle. Moreover, it
mirrors exactly the second definition of "perform"-the expansion in
space and time of the range over which a given communication can
be accomplished-which resulted from the communications system
45
analysis discussed earlier.
On this point, however, the Supreme Court reversed, and held
that the importation of even distant signals did not alter for copyright
purposes the basic viewer function CATV perfonns. 46 On the first three
points, the 6-3 Court upheld the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and
ruled that even though these new services-program origination, sale
of advertising time, and interconnection with other CATV systemsmay allow the systems to compete more effectively with broadcasters
for the television market, they do not convert the entire system into
a "broadcast function." The court reasoned that in none of these functions is there any nexus with the cable operator's reception and re47
channeling of the broadcaster's copyrighted materials.
B. Application of the CATV Cases to Aiken
In applying the CATV precedents to Aiken, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals found them significant in four points:
First: Teleprompter reaffirms the Fortnightly functional test.
Second: Teleprompter, as did Fortnightly, rejects unequivocally the
quantitative test of Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle.

Third: Despite the arguments advanced respecting (a) program origination; (b) sale of commercials; and (c) interconnection... CATV
systems were nevertheless committed to the "viewer" (as distinct from
the "broadcaster") side of the line.
Fourth: Despite the advanced technology required for "local" signals
'(and even more so) for "distant" signals, the Supreme Court never43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 349.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 6-10 supra.
415 U.S. at 408.

47. Id. at 405.
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theless held the 4reception
and rechannelling of these signals a
8
"viewer" function.
The court then concluded that Aiken was surely as much a "viewer."
rather than a "broadcaster," as were the CATV services and cotild not
be held liable for infringement of the copyrighted songs. "If 'Fortnightly, with its elaborate CATV plant and Teleprompter wifth its
eyen more sophisticated and extended technological and programming
facilities were not 'performing,' then logic dictates that no 'performance' resulted when the defendant Aiken merely activated his restaurant radio."49 The Supreme Court in Aiken approved both the result
and the reasoning of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and then
added some considerations of its own. While still paying lip-s.ervice
to the authority of Jewell-LaSalle, the Court in Aiken stressed that' boith
Fortnightly and Teleprompter had disavowed that the reception' bf an
electronic broadcast can constitute a performance when the broadcaster
himself is licensed to perform the copyrighted material that he performs. Thus, to hold that Aiken "performed" the songs w0uld require the Court to overrule two recent decisions, and thereby 6ffend
the principle of stare decisis.5" In further defense of the holding, the
Court noted that to hold Aiken liable would be both wholly unenfo6rcable, and highly inequitable. As the Court explained, the inequity
would arise in two ways. First, a person in Aiken's position would
have no sure way of protecting himself save by turning off his radio
because it would be practically impossible, even if he were licetised
by- ASCAP, to predict whether or when a piece to which someone else
held copyright would be broadcast. Second, to hold that anyoneitin
Aiken's position "performed" would be to authorize the sale qf an
untold number of licenses for what is basically a single public rendition, a tribute far beyond what is necessary for the economic protection of copyright owners. 51
Although concurring in the result, Justice Blackmun in a separate opinion expressed real, though admittedly outdated, discomfort
with three aspects of the majority's opinion: (1) Factual: Respondent
Aiken was not just an innocent "listener." He had installed four
speakers in his shop and the music was part of what he offered in his
trade. (2) Precedential: Agreeing with Justice Fortas' dissent in Fort48.
49.
50.
51.

500 F.2d at 135-36.
Id. at 137.
95 S. Ct. at 2046-47.
Id. at 2047.
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nightly and echoing his own dissent in Teleprompter, Justice Blacknun expressed the belief that Jewell-LaSalle should have been deter'mnative for Fortnightly and Teleprompter. But since it was not, at
'least Fortnightly and Teleprompter should have been limited to the
pafficular industry with which they dealt-CATV-ather than limitIvg Jewell-LaSalle to precisely its own facts. (3) Tactical: Justice
Blackmun could not understand why the Court was so reluctant' i0
do directly what it was obviously doing indirectly, overruling JewellLaSalle:
[T]he Court in Fortnightly limited Jewell-LaSalle "to its own facts,"
and in Teleprompter ignored its existence completely by refusing
even to cite it....
The Court dances around Jewell-LaSalle., as in,....deed it must, for it is potent opposing precedent for the52present case
,nd stands stalwart against respondent Aiken's position.
chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas dissented in Aiken, -as they
"had'ii Teleprompter. Agreeing with Justice Blackmun's reservations,
they' found little in the holding with which they could agree: "The
rsult reached by the Court is not compelled by the language of the
statute; it is contrary to the applicable case law and, even assuming
the correctness and relevance of the CATV cases, . . . it is not- analytically dictated by those cases."15 3 Instead, they saw Jew'ell-LaSalle'as
directly relevant since the ASCAP license held by the broadcaster in
Aiken expressly prohibited him from further licensing performanceS
by-'those who commercially received and distributed his programs.
Finally, it was noted that this case does not call for what the majority
described as "a ruling that a radio listener 'performs' every broadcast
that he receives,"5 4 for "respondent received the transmission and then
put it to an independent commercial use." 55 Therefore, the dissenters
concluded Aiken should be held liable for infringement.
C. Is the Aiken Holding Dictated by the CATV Cases?
In' suggesting that the Aiken ruling was not complled by the
CATV cases, dissenting Chief Justice Burger observed that Aiken was
52. Id. at 2049 (concurring opinion).
53. Id. at 2050 (dissenting opinion).
,154.' Id. at 2047. This prospect is as upsetting as the majority apparently considered
it, only -if "performing" is equivalent to "infringing," which it is not. Even if a radio
listener (rather his apparatus) did perform every broadcast that his apparatus received,
a proposition the Jewell-LaSalle Court posited without alarm, the listener still would not
be held to be infringing, for he did not perform "publicly for profit." Buck v. 'JewellLaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 196 (1931).
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2050 (dissenting opinion).
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more than a "pLssive beneficiary" of the radio program. broadcast.
Concurring Justice Blackmun agreed, noting that the music was part
of what Aiken offered in his trade. But measuring Aiken's activity
against other characteristics by which the Fortnightly Court sought to
distinguish broadcasters (performers) from CATV systems (viewers,
hence non-performers), the radio and four-speaker system fall on the
CATV side of the line.
Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems simply
carry, without editing, whatever programs they receive. Broadcasters
procure programs and propagate them to the public; CATV systems
receive programs that have been released to the public and carry
them by private channels to additional viewers." °
Justice Burger further tried to distinguish Aiken from the CATV
cases by noting: "Here, respondent received the transmission and then
put it to an independent commercial use.' 5 7 That statement, however,
describes exactly what the CATV systems were doing. Indeed, the use
by the cable companies was even more explicitly commercial than in
Aiken's restaurant, since providing the reception and collecting subscription fees constituted the heart of the CATV companies' business.
In contrast, providing music for employees and customers was, only
an incidental part of what Aiken offered in his restaurant.
Yet, the fact remains that Aiken was not a "passive beneficiary,"
How then could he have been held not to perform? The confusion
on this point lies within Fortnightly itself and not in its application
to Aiken. The term "passive beneficiary" was used by the Court in
Fortnightly to distinguish a broadcaster from a viewer. "One is treated
as active performer; the other, as passive beneficiary."5 8 in deciding
whether CATV fell more on the broadcaster or viewer side, the Court
held that it fell more on the viewer's side in that it was more of a
passive beneficiary than an active performer. Thus, although the
Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's quantitative test of "How
much did the petitioner do to bring about the viewing and hearing
of a copyrighted work?" and substituted its own so-called functional
test embodying a broadcaster/viewer distinction, in practice, the functional test was quantitative too. It could be phrased, "How much of
the characteristics of a broadcaster/viewer does this particular activity
represent?" Thus, Fortnightly left the door open for cases like Tele56. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968).
57. 95 S. Ct. at 2050.
58. 392 U.S. at 399.
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prompter in which the question could be presented as follows, "Do
these additional CATV functions-origination of programming on
non-broadcast channels, interconnection with other CATV systems,
microwave transmission, and importation of distant signals-add up
quantitatively to enough of a broadcasting function to take Teleprompter qualitatively out of the 'viewer' category and put it into the
'broadcaster' category?" 59
This quantitative aspect of Fortnightly's "functional" test was
implicitly recognized by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in deciding Aiken when it used a "How much?" type of analysis in holding
Aiken to be non-infringing: "If Fortnightly, with its elaborate CATV
plant and Teleprompter with its even more sophisticated and extended
technological and programming facilities were not 'performing,' then
logic dictates that no 'performance' resulted when the defendant Aiken
merely activated his restaurant radio." 60 The Aiken holding, then, not
only flows from, but indeed is dictated by the so-called "functional"
test of Fortnightly and Teleprompter. The quantitative aspect of this
"functional" test, the part overlooked by Justice Burger, compels a
finding that Aiken's simple apparatus falls on the "viewer" or safe
side of this standard.
III. JUDicIAL LEGISLATION

A. Loose Language: Reception, Reproduction, Performance and
Infringement
As discussed above,6 ' the CATV cases, plus the outcome they
dictated in Aiken, did reverse Jewell-LaSalle. One of the chief reasons
that this reversal was possible without directly overruling JewellLaSalle stems from the fact that loose language and inconsistent usage
have caused the case law to move away from the traditional understanding of the statutory term "perform." The reason for the shift
has not been articulated by the Court, nor has the new interpretation
been adequately reconciled with the old. The change has been marked,
59. The quantitative aspect is suggested also by the way in which the Second Circuit phrased the issue in Teleprompter: "[W]hether the character of CATV is so changed.
by the additional services that the cable systems here have undertaken that their total
operation, including the reception service, under the Fortnightly functional test, havebecome functionally equivalent to those of a broadcaster, and thus these systems should
be deemed to 'perform' the broadcast programming that they distribute." CBS, Inc. vTeleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 346 (2d Cir. 1973).
60. 500 F.2d at 137.
61. See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
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more by the Court's intuitive sense of what "should be." This procedure has led to what appears on the surface to be a capricious break
in logic, begun between Jewell-LaSalle and Fortnightly and completed
in Aiken. Yet, upon closer examination, the basic cause for this
change may be found not in the judiciary, but in the dated, restrictive
conception of the copyright provisions themselves.
To aid in the analysis, the communication chain for a television
broadcast and reception is sketched out below:
(1) Person Speaks and Appears
(Sender - of sound and sight)
(2) Medium
(air)

(8) Medium

(3) Microphone/Camera
(Conversion Device)
(Receiver plus Sender of sound and sight)
(4) Medium
(wires)

(6) Medium
(air)
(7) Antenna
(Conversion Device)

(wires)(air)

(wires)
(9) Television Set
(Conversion Device)
(10) Medium
(11) TV Listener/Viewer

(5) Transmitter
(Conversion Device)

(Receiver of sound and sight)
Example 4

The next variation in this scheme might well be the introduction
of CATV. If the cable system were a simple one, as in Fortnightly,
the controversy in such a case could be analyzed as turning on whether
the cables were to be considered a Medium or a Conversion Device
(Receiving and Sending, and in the process of sending, becoming a
"performer"). Taken purely in the abstract, the CATV system in
Fortnightly acted entirely as a Medium. Functionally, it only conveyed the programming from the transmitter to the home receiving
apparatus, the television set and antenna, which is precisely the purpose of air in airwave broadcasting. However, since the CATV system
made programming available in areas where historically it had not
been available because of natural mountain barriers, it is arguable
that the system did involve a broadcast or "performance." Thus, it
seems xeasonable to conclude that the cables served as a Medium
within the range of airwave transmission, but as a Conversion Device
outside that range. Rather than introducing that distinction, however, the Fortnightly Court dismissed the importance of the system's
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Receiver-Sender function by equating it with the role performed by
television sets and antennas. Such an equation was perfectly legitimate
according to the type of communications system analysis, given in
Example 462 since both television sets and antennas function as Conversion Devices.
It is true that a CATV system plays an "active" role in making
reception possible in a given area, but so do ordinary television sets
and antennas. GATV equipment is powerful and sophisticated, but
the basic function the equipment serves is little different from that
6
served by the equipment generally furnished by a television viewer. 3
Although the analogy was legitimate, the conclusion drawn from

~t as less carefully constructed. To what was the analogy relevantthe fact of "performance" or the fact of "infringement"? Again, the
Jewell-LaSalle Court was more precise in its langauge and more sensitive to the separate elements that establish liability:
The parties agree that the owner of a private radio receiving set who
in his own home invites friends to hear a musical composition which
is being broadcast, would not be liable for infringement. For even
if this be deemed a performance, it is neither public nor for profit."
But the Fortnightly Court slid by the reasoning of Jewell-LaSalle which
was statutorily and logically much more sound. The analogy to be
drawn between a television set and a cable system is relevant only to
the issue of whether or not a CATV system "performs." If it does
not "perform," then the question of "publicly for profit" never arises.
If a CATV system does "perform," then it can easily be distinguished
from a television set in just the manner proposed by the Jewell-LaSalle
Court, because the CATV system clearly operates "publicly for profit.'"
In Aiken, the Fortnightly analogy was carried back into the radio
field, with the logic running as follows: CATV serves essentially the
same function as a television set (Fortnightly), a radio receiver with
four speakers is a much less elaborate device than a CATV apparatus,
and since a CATV system does not "perform," Aiken's radio system
cannot be held to "perform."
This result disturbed Justice Blackmun because, as he observed,
[i]n one sense . .. he [Aiken] was a listener ....
would have no difficulty.
62. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
63. 392 U.S. at 399 (footnote omitted).
64. 283 U.S. at 196.
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But respondent Aiken installed four loudspeakers in his small
shop.... It was part of what [he] offered his trade .... 05

The line of reasoning actually used in the two cases appears
schematically below:
Fortnightly:
(1) B (CATV) equals A (TV set).
(2) A is a viewer.
(3) B is more of a viewer than a broadcaster.
(4) Therefore B does not perform.
Aiken:
(5) C (Aiken's apparatus) is less than or equal to B
(CATV).
(6) B does not perform.
(7) Therefore C does not perform.
Combining these statements results in the discrepancy noted by Justice
Blackmun:
(8) B equals A.
(9) C is less than or equal to B.
(10) Therefore C is less than or equal to A.
But C (Aiken's apparatus) is more than A (TV set) because Aiken
put his set to independent commercial use, whereas the private television viewer would not.
This apparent fallacy arises from the fact that there should have
been two elements considered in each step of the reasoning, not just
one. Thus, at each juncture, two relationships should have been
examined: the relationship with respect to "performance," and the
relationship with respect to "publicly for profit." Such a procedure
would have resulted in the following reasoning:
Fortnightly:
B (CATV) equals A (TV set).
(1) "Performance"B does not equal A.
Profit"(2) "Publicly for
Aiken:
(3) "Performance"(4) "Publicly for Profit"65. 95 S. Ct. at 2048 (concurring opinion).

C (Aiken's apparatus) equals B
(CATV).
G equals B.
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The net result of the foregoing is that C (Aiken's apparatus) does not
equal A (TV set). This result makes clear that the gap in the Court's
logic arises within Fortnightly itself, and not in the way it was applied
to Aiken.
The issue of whether or not a radio or television set performs is
not likely ever to be litigated directly because, as the Jewell-LaSalle
Court observed, "even if this be deemed a performance, it is neither
public nor for profit."66 Whether or not a television set performs,
however, became a critical consideration in Fortnightly since the
CATV system was held not to perform through an analogy to a television set. In a strict Jewell-LaSalle sense, both the television set and
CATV could well have been held to perform. Even the Fortnightly
Court recognized implicitly that this could be the case when it compared the television viewer with the theater-goer:
The television broadcaster in one sense does less than the exhibitor of a motion picture or stage play; he supplies his audience not
with visible images but only with electronic signals. The viewer conversely does more than a member of a theater audience; he provides
the equipment6 7to convert electronic signals into audible sound and
visible images.
Thus, the Fortnightly Court acknowledged that the television viewer
provides a Conversion Device, his set, which under Jewell-LaSalle
would seem to play a reproducing, hence performing, role. Yet because
the performing was not done publicly for profit, it would not have
been infringing. The CATV system, on the other hand, probably
would have been held not only to perform under Jewell-LaSalle standards, but also publicly for profit; hence, it would have been held to
be infringing.
However, the Fortnightly Court did not observe this two-fold
test for infringement, essential under the Jewell-LaSalle type of analysis. It observed instead that "broadcasters have been judicially treated
as exhibitors, and viewers as members of a theater audience"' 6 8 without
supporting this assertion with any citations. It then concluded, "Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform." 69 In support of the latter
proposition, the Court cited pre-Jewell-LaSalle district court cases
which were no longer valid after the Supreme Court's ruling in Jewell66. 283 U.S. at 196.
67. 392 U.S. at 398.

68. Id.
69. Id.
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LaSalle.70 So the Court "dance[d] around Jewell-LaSalle" not only
in Aiken, but in Fortnightly as well. Its holding that television sets
do not perform was without valid precedent and was contrary to the
implications of Jewell-LaSalle. Thus, the Court sought acceptance for
its declaration by an appeal to generally-understood, common-sense
notions that were, however, at odds with traditional statutory usage
and decisional precedents. By declaring that television sets and antennas do not perform and that, by analogy, CATV systems do not
perform, the Court broke with the logic of Jewell-LaSalle and set out
upon an independent, unprecedented course. Examination of the legislative and administrative background of the CATV cases will reveal,
however, that the Court was not just being careless with its language.
Rather, it was being responsive to new developments in communicadons technology which highlighted how wooden and inadequate the
old copyright provisions were. Since Congress responded inadequately
to those developments, the Court was faced with the need to redefine
the statutory word "perform." This process of redefinition will be
discussed after examining the legislative background to the Court's
break in Fortnightly and its progeny with the sound reasoning of the
Jewell-LaSalle precedent.
B. Why Did the Court So Act?
Throughout the foregoing discussion, the Supreme Court by implication has been chided for its loose handling of the statutory
language. Yet if one looks carefully into the administrative and legislative background behind the cases herein discussed, it becomes apparent that the Court was only trying to remedy the chaotic condition
of the communications industry which had been created by Congress'
failure to act and the industry's economic narrow-mindedness.
In dissenting from the Fortnightly majority, Justice Fortas had
observed:
The task of caring for CATV is one for Congress. Our ax, being a
rule of law, must cut straight, sharp, and deep; and perhaps this is
70. The cases cited were Buck v. DeBaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929) and
Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). It also
cited Associated Music Publishers v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1944) and Select Theaters Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), and congressional enactment in 1952 of 17 U.S.C. § 1(c) (1970), a special
damages provision for "infringement by broadcast." All of this supports the proposition
that broadcasters perform, but not the contention that a television or CATV viewer
does not perform.
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a situation that calls for the compromise of theory and for the
architectural improvisation which only legislation can accomplish 7 1
In fact, the majority found itself with an ax which was so crooked,
gouged, and rusty, that it was outiaged to have to use it. Had the
applicable legislation not been such an "architectural improvisation"
and not been so compromising theoretically, then that legislation
would have remained sharp and usable even years after it was enacted.
The roots of the Court's problem are to be found in the conceptual inadequacy of the copyright statute itself and in the Federal
Communications Commission's negligent administration of the industry for which it was responsible. The latter shall be treated here
because it was the direct cause of the CATV cases ever being brought,
and once brought, of being tried on a theory of copyright infringement.
From the very start, the FCC had been reluctant to assume responsibility for CATV. In 1959, a full nine years after the establishment of the first commercial system, the Commission found CATV
"related to interstate transmission," yet stated that it "did
not
intend to regulate CATV." It preferred to recommend legislation
which would impose specified requirements on such systems.7 2 Such
legislation was proposed, but not enacted.7 3 Although lacking specific
congressional mandate, the FCC nonetheless found it necessary gradually to assert jurisdiction over various aspects of the industry. This led,
inevitably, to a challenge in the courts of the Commission's authority
to regulate.
The issue of the FCC's competence over CATV reached the
Supreme Court in the October term of 1967, when United States v.
Southwestern Cable74 was heard together with Midwest TV Inc. v.
Southwestern Cable.75 In determining that the Commission did have
authority over CATV, the Supreme Court employed an impressive
array of language to demonstrate the broad scope of the FCC's responsibility.7 6 The implication which followed was that with such
71. 392 U.S. 408 (dissenting opinion).
72. United Statesv. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
73. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
74. 392 U.S. 157 (1967).
75. 4 F.C.C.2d 612 (1966). The FCC regulations which underlay the Southwestern
cases banned CATV transmission of distant signals into the 100 largest television markets (except for such service as existed on February 15, 1966, or unless the FCC found
the service would be consistent with the public interest) and created summary procedures
for applications for separate or additional relief. 392 U.S. 157 (1967).
76. The provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, explicitly
apply to "all interstate and foreign communications by wire or radio." 47 U.S.C. §
152(a) (1970). The Commission is charged to "make available . . . to all the people
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broad responsibilities, the Commission must certanly have adequate
power to discharge them. The Court concluded that the Communications Act of 1934, and its terms, purposes, and history, all indicated
that Congress, by creating the FCC, "formulated a unified and com7
prehensive regulatory system for the indusrty."
By virtue of this decision, the FCC was authorized to channel the
"explosive growth" of CATV which it already had recognized in its
Second Report & Order.7 8 It seems clear that this rapid growth situation was precisely what Congress had in mind when it directed the
Commission "from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires, [to] .. . [s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest."' 0 Also, CATV was
potentially a tremendous boost for the public interest; since as early
as 1940 it had been declared that an important part of that interest
was "the ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service
to the community reached by his broadcasts."' 0 The service of CATV
was more dependable, more wide-ranging, and of better quality than
that of air-wave technology. It seemed ideally suited to help achieve
the goal of a "rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service." '
Furthermore, it had been held that the criterion of public interest
was not limited to technological considerations, but comprised the
more general end to which the Commission's "comprehensive powers
to promote and realize the vast potentialities of radio"8' 2 should be
directed. A full three years before the Southwestern decision, the
Commission had expressed concern over whether the public was being
adequately served in the area of television programming. In a 1965
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the Commission declared that "the
three networks . . . would appear to have unnecessarily and unduly
of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service . . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The Commission is to serve
as the "single Government agency" with "unified jurisdiction" and "regulatory power
over all forms of electrical communication, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or
radio." 392 U.S. at 168. To achieve this, it was given "broad authority." Id.
77. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting, 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
78. 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 738 n.15 (1966).
79. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303(g) (1970).
80. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
82. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
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foreclosed access to other sources of programs."8 8 Consequently, it had
proposed certain rules designed to "foster free competition in TV program markets" and to encourage "the growth of alternate sources of
TV programs for both network and non-network exhibition."8' 4 By
properly exploiting the potentials of CATV, then, the Commission
might well have been able not only to upgrade the technological aspects of broadcasting, but also, because of the multiple-channel capability of cable transmission, to encourage the "development of diverse
and antagonistic sources of program service."' 5
It was altogether too good to be true. The FCC originally had
rejected responsibility for CATV on the grounds that such systems
were neither common carriers nor broadcasters.8 6 Once it did begin
to oversee the industry, it did so from a restrictive rather than a constructive point of view. It found that the probability of CATV's adverse effect upon potential and existing service had become too substantial to be dismissed sT It reasoned that the importation of distant
signals created a "substantial competition" for local broadcasting.88
Further, it found that CATV competition could have a significant
negative effect upon station audiences and revenues.8 9 So, instead of
encouraging and channeling the obvious potential of CATV both as
a broadcaster and as a common carrier, the FCC sought to limit its
impact on the communications industry as the industry was currently
structured.
At the same time Southwestern was being litigated on procedural
matters to establish the FCC's jurisdiction, Fortnightly, representing
virtually the same kind of factual controversy, was being litigated on
the merits. Out of desperation over the FCC's failure to regulate the
new industry, United Artists had sued Fortnightly on a theory of
copyright infringement. The Fortnightly decision, which was handed
83. FCC Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Vol. 22, at 3 (1965), quoted in Mount

Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 474 (2d Cir. 1971).
84. Id.
85. FCC, Report and Order, Vol. 28, at 4282 (May 7, 1970), quoted in Mount
Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 474 (2d Cir. 1971).
86. Report and Order on CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-2&
(1959). In the same document, the FCC refused to premise regulations for CATV upon
assertedly adverse consequences for broadcasting, apparently not because they would be
inadequate grounds, but because the Commission could not "determine where the impact
takes effect, although we recognize that it may well exist." Eventually, the FCC did
defend its jurisdiction on exactly those grounds, namely, its adverse consequences for
conventional broadcasting. 26 F.C.C. at 431.
87. First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713-14 (1965).
88. Id. at 707.
89. Id. at 710-11.
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down only a week after Southwestern, reflected opposition to the obstructionist attitude which the FCC had displayed consistently towards
CATV.
Why, in ruling favorably towards the CATV industry, did the
Court choose to act in such a way that it could be charged with
abandoning its rusty statutory ax? Hints of the reasons underlying
the actions of the Court can be found in the history of the CATV
"issue" and in comments scattered throughout the CATV opinions and
Aiken.
In protest against the Teleprompter majority, Justice Douglas
charged, "The Court today makes an extraordinary excursion into the
legislative field." 90 He was probably correct, but the move was hardly
made precipitously. From the very birth of CATV, responsibility for
hard decisions about its nature and its position within the general
field of broadcasting had been handed from one governmental branch
to another. Almost every case involving the medium included an
appeal to Congress or the FCC to get into action. However, Congress
continually failed to respond or explicitly returned the matter to the
courts. The FCC's reluctance to assume jurisdiction has been discussed. The FCC preferred to recommend legislation which would.
impose specified requirements on cable systems. Such legislation was
introduced in the Senate in 1959, favorably reported, and debated on
the Senate floor. The bill was, however, ultimately returned to committee. 91 Again in 1966, the Commission sought legislation that would
have explicitly authorized such regulation. The bill was favorably reported by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
but failed to reach the floor for debate. 92 In response to the FCC, the
House Committee said merely that it did not "either agree or disagree"
with the jurisdictional conclusions of the Second Report, and that "the
question of whether or not ... the Commission has authority under
present law to regulate CATV systems is for the courts to decide.... .,93
It was against this backdrop that the Court decided United States v.'
Southwestern Cable.
The responsibility for determining CATV's copyright liability
was similarly passed around. The issue was first presented in the Fort-.
90.
91.
(1959);
92.
93.

415 U.S. at 416 (dissenting opinion).
S. 2653, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. REP. No. 923, 86th Cong., Ist Sess.
106 CONG. REc. 10416-36, 10520-48 (1959).
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 n.30 (1968).
H.R. REP. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
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nightly case. In response to Fortnightly's contention that it sholild not
be subjected to copyright liability because the problems raised'by
CATV were too multifaceted and complex for judicial resoluti6n, the
distiict Court agreed that CATV raised many serious problems of
public policy which were not adequately briefed in the record of the
case. Despite these reservations, however, the court assumed its responsibility to "decide the issue presented to [it]" 94 and rendered its decision.
When Fortnightly reached the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General of the United States initially suggested that the Court defer judgment in order to allow a speedy completion of pending legislative
proceedings. Congress failed to act, however, so the Solicitor General,
as amicus curiae, then asked the Court to render a compromise decision, that would accommodate various competing considerations of
copyright, communications, and antitrust policy-in other words; to
legislate.9 5 Tacitly agreeing with the Second Circuit's observation that
a court, cannot undertake the fashioning of detailed rules, such as those
in the. FCC's Second Report96 or in the proposed copyright law revision, 97 the Supreme Court replied curtly, "We decline the invitation.
That job is for Congress."98
The post-Fortnightly attempts at copyright law revision fared no
better than had their predecessors; so six years after the Fortnightly
decision, the courts were still without additional legislative guidance
when they were asked to rule on the Teleprompter case. The Second
Circuit commented on the situation with a polite and slightly rueful
request at the end of its opinion. Judge Lumbard observed:
The complex problems presented by the issues in this case are not
readily amenable to judicial resolution. As the Supreme Court said
in Fortnightly, '[w]e [must] take the Copyright Act of 1909 as we
find it," and do the best we can. We hope that Congress will in due
course legislate a fuller and more flexible accommodation of competing copyright, anti-trust, and communications policy considerations, consistent with the challenge of modem CATV technology. 99
The Supreme Court, however, sounded rather testy as it made
its "legislative excursion." CBS had argued that if CATV systems were
94. 377 F.2d at 884-85.
95. 392 U.S. at 401.
96. 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).

97.

See, e.g., S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1975).

98. 392 U.S. at 401 (footnotes omitted).
99. 476 F.2d at 354.
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allowed to import programs and rechannel them into secondary
markets, they would dilute the profitability of later syndications. In
response to this argument, the Court observed that although from, the
point of view of the broadcasters such market extension may mark a
reallocation of the potential number of viewers a station may reach,
this redistribution is "a fact of no direct concern under the Copyright
Act." 100 Such market changes would simply mean that a broadcaster
would pay for copyrighted material on the basis of the size of the
direct broadcast market augmented by the size of the CATV market.
"In any event, a determination of the best alternative structure for providing compensation to copyright holders, or a prediction of the possible evolution in the relationship between advertising markets and the
television medium is beyond the competence of the court." 10
In specifically addressing itself to the question of whether or not
a preference for current economic configuration is to be implied from
the Copyright Act, the Court hit at the heart of the matter. The
entire complicated set of "performance" provisions in the statute was
occasioned originally by the desire on the part of owners of specific
technologies to protect themselves against the economic consequences
of the introduction of newer technologies, even when these new capabilities promised to serve the underlying purpose of the copyright law
better than would the older ones.1 02 The Supreme Court in Ailen
recognized implicitly the unfair consequences of this statutory structure when it stressed the inequitable results which would flow from
holding Aiken liable for infringement. In language that credited Congress with balanced intent, yet seemed to charge copyright owners
with overreaching, the Court observed:
[T]o hold that all in Aiken's position "performed" these musical compositions would be to authorize the sale of an untold number of
licenses for what is basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted work. The exaction of such multiple tribute would go far
beyond what is required for the economic protection of copyright
100. 415 U.S. at 413.

101. Id. at 413 n.15.
102. See, e.g., the Second Circuit holding in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp. that 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e), the exclusive right to perform section, was drawn
to meet "the narrow problem presented by the Apollo case." 221 F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir.
1955). The problem that underlay the Apollo suit was that player piano rolls were eating
into the market formerly occupied by sheet music. So Congress responded to protect the
owners of the copyright in the sheet music by giving them the exclusive right to perform
the composition.

1976]

COPYRIGHT AND COMMUNICATION

owners, and would be wholly at odds with the balanced Congressional

purpose behind 17 U.S.C. §1 (e)

....

103

Thus, the Court struck out in an instinctive way at an important conceptual inadequacy of the copyright law. This inadequacy can be seen
as resulting from congressional accommodation of owners of copyright
interests in older technologies at the expense of those with interests
in newer technologies. This accommodation took place despite the
fact that more recent developments may serve the underlying purposes
of the copyright statute at least as well as, if not better than, the older
media.
IV. THE NEw INTERPRETATION OF "PERF.ORM"
A. Aiken and Its Implications
The classic interpretation of the statutory word "perform" was
expressed by the Jewell-LaSalle Court in the following language:
We are satisfied that the reception of a radio broadcast and its translation into audible sound is not a mere audition of the original program. It is essentially a reproduction. . . The transmitted radio
waves require a receiving set for their detection and translation into
audible sound waves, just as the record requires another mechanism
for the reproduction of a recorded composition. . . Reproduction
in both cases amounts to a performance.' 0 4
As has been noted before, the Court recognized, by using the terms
"reception" and "translation," that the hotel's apparatus served a dual
function; it not only received the program, but also acted upon it in
such a way that the program was audible in places where it otherwise
would not have been. This is the same dual-role phenomenon which
was labeled a Conversion Device in the communications chain analysis
discussed earlier. 10 5 The Court then connected "performance" directly
with "translation" by saying that it was essentially a "reproduction,"
which is the same concept associated with the Sending function of
electronic communications devices, the so-called Conversion Devices.
Thus, according to the Jewell-LaSalle understanding of "performance,"
it potentially could occur anywhere within a system, for the system
is linked throughout by devices which serve both a receiving and
a sending function. To illustrate, a sketch of Aiken's situation is given
103. 95 S. Ct. at 2047.
104. 283 U.S. at 199-201.
105. See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
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below. "S" denotes a Sending function, "R" a Receiving one, and
"m" the medium.
S

Im

Musical
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(1)

air

m

->

(2)
-

wires

--

Tape or
Disc
(7)

(6)
R/S

R/S
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-
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(4)
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-

Im

--

wires
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R/S

--

wires

4 Speakers

(14)

(15)

R

-

Ultimate
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(17)
Example 5

Under the traditional interpretation, "performance" could occur anywhere that the Sending role of a Conversion Device effected "translation into audible sound."'1 6 Thus, prior to Jewell-LaSalle, various
Sending links had already been tagged as "performing:" Link No. 3,
the live performer; Link No. 9, playing a tape or disc; Link No. 11,
the final step in what in layman's language is commonly referred to as
"broadcasting." And Jewell-LaSalle added Link No. 13 to the list of
"performers" in that the radio reception "translated," "reproduced,"
and thus "performed."'' 0 7 Under this type of analysis, the position of
the Conversion Device, the human performer, or the electronic hardware, within the system was not the critical consideration. The important factor was that it functioned as "translator," or "reproducer,"
hence "performer." By virtue of this understanding, a logical extension of Jewell-LaSalle to Fortnightly would have been to eliminate the
"into audible sound" restriction and hold that the "translation," "reproduction," or "Sending" function served by CATV in introducing
106. 283 U.S. at 200-01.
107. Id.
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signals into new territory amounted to "performing." The Fortnightly
Court rejected this path, however, and introduced instead its broadcaster/viewer analysis. It has already been observed that despite the
Supreme Court's disavowal of the Second Circuit's "quantitative" test,
there is a "How much?" aspect to the Court's so-called "functional"
test.1 0 8

Another way of analyzing the same phenomenon is to note that in
terms of the communications system chain, the Fortnightly test can
be seen not only as a "quantitative" one, but perhaps also as a "positional" one. In other words, it now arguably appears that whether a
given electronic device can be termed a "performer" depends not on
whether in fact it individually functions as a "Sender" or not. Rather,
it is termed a "performer" or not according to its position within the
overall communications chain under discussion.
In developing its new understanding of the word "perform," the
Fortnightly Court did not disturb the traditional understanding of the
word insofar as it had been applied to links in the chain up to the
point commonly referred to as broadcasting. That is, in terms of
Example 5,109 it did not concern itself with Links Nos. 1-11. But
beyond that point, between the "broadcaster," a function culminating
with Link No. 11, and the ultimate viewer, Link No. 17, it introduced
its so-called "functional" test which arguably can be thought of as a
positional test. For in judging each of the factual situations found in
Fortnightly, Teleprompter, and Aiken, the Court appears to have taken
the attitude that the closer the questioned activity is positioned to the
ultimate listener, the viewer, the more likely it will be held not to be
"performance," even though the individual piece of electronic equipment involved functions as a Sender in the overall chain.
Under the Jewell-LaSalle interpretation of "perform," any link
in the chain which served as a Sender was actually, or had the potential
of being judicially declared to be, a "performer." Under the Fortnightly view, however, the part of the chain between "broadcaster"
and "viewer" can be seen to have been placed on a continuum. Determining who was a "performer" then became a matter of determining
case by case whether a given electronic device was positioned closer
to the "performing" or "non-performing" end of this continuum, or
as the Court phrased it, whether it "functioned" more as a viewer or
as a broadcaster. 110
108. See text accompanying notes 58 & 59 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.

110. 392 U.S. at 400.
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By making the "broadcaster" one end of the continuum over
which the new definitional test for "performance" will be applied, the
Supreme Court raises a very interesting possibility for future development in this area. Might the commercial broadcast eventually come
to be treated in a manner analogous to that in which a single copy of
a book is treated? That argument was advanced and rejected in JewellLaSalle, but might be reconsidered since the Aiken de facto reversal.
As advanced in Jewell-LeSalle, the position is as follows:
The argument here urged, however, is that since the transmitting of
a musical composition by a commercial broadcasting station is a
public performance for profit, control of the initial radio rendition
exhausts the monopolies conferred-both that of making copies ...
and that of giving public performances for profit .. .; and that a
monopoly of the reception, for commercial purposes, of this same
rendition is not warranted by the Act. The analogy is invoked of the
rule under which an author who permits copies of his writings to
be made cannot, by virtue of his copyright, prevent or restrict the
transfer of such copies.... This analogy is inapplicable .... 111
Whether Aiken's de facto overruling of the holding in Jewell-LaSalie
may eventually lead to an acceptance of this analogy remains to be
seen. This extension is one of the most far-reaching of the possibilities opened up by the new definition of "performance." Language
used, for example, in Teleprompter could be built upon to accomplish this result. There, Justice Stewart observed, "The electronic
signals it [a CATV system] receives and rechannels have already been
'released to the public' even though they may not be normally available to the specific segment of the public served by the CATV system." "1 2 Yet the ad hoc nature of the broadcaster/viewer test makes

it unclear as yet the extent to which the logical implications of this
new definition will be adopted. In practice, the economics of the
situation, rather than the consistent logic suggested by communications system analysis, may well twist the result. Such a distortion of a
logical end is made easier by the rather imprecise way in which the
Court first stated and then developed the broadcaster/viewer test. It
is conceivable, for example, that there might be developed a way of
exploiting a radio broadcast that is so successful commercially and so
increases the range of an ordinary radio set that unless the activity
were held to be analogous to that of CATV, it might be held to be
111. 283 U.S. at 197.
112. 415 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added).
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more in the nature of broadcasting than viewing. If such a development occurred, then the continuum definition of "perform," which
currently serves as a logical and coherent reconciliation of the CATV
cases plus Aiken, would have to be dropped. The possibility of such
dapricious results points up the unsatisfactory nature of the broadcaster/viewer test as currently articulated. However, the continuum
concept, although not ideal if one were to legislate it, does have the
virtue of being consistent with past decisions and allowing for continued orderly and relatively predictable development of the case law
of "performance." The adoption of the "copy of a book" analogy
would go even further towards settling this area of copyright law in a
manner reflecting the judicially presumed "balanced congressional
3
purpose.""
B. History's DistortingInfluence on the Copyright Act
Traditional understanding of the statutory word "perform" has
revolved primarily around one of two phenomena, as was stressed
earlier: 114 (1) the conversion of communication from one sensory me-

dium to another, most commonly sight to sound in music, or (2) the
expansion in space and time of the range over which a given communication can be accomplished. With respect to both of these, it is
history alone, the history of technological development, which has
given the word "perform" its legal meaning, up to and through
Jewell-LaSalle. This proposition is demonstrable through consideration of only the content of the communication, the music itself, without being influenced by the history of which technological device was
developed first to aid in its transmission.
First of all, consider "performance" as sensory conversion. Music
is sound. It is an audible phenomenon. In order for such communication to occur, it is not necessary for there to exist any visual aspect
to the exchange whatsoever. The visual aspect of music, the score, is
so central legally only because it was the earliest technology available
by which music could be fixed and thus subject to copyright protec113. 95 S. Ct. at 2047. The proposed copyright revision bill eliminates this possibility for CATV by incorporating elaborate license fee schedules. S. 22, 94th Cong.,
ist Sess. §§ 111(c), (d) (1975). However, the analogy is still a provocative one,
should the aim of congressional copyright revision ever extend substantially beyond
the protection of established industry economic configurations to include a reconsideration of the extent to which the copyright statute carries out the basic aims of the constitutional copyright clause:
114. See text accompanying notes 10 & 11 supra.
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don. However, by no means was it indispensible, or even necessarily
desirable, for this aural communication to be represented visually.
Had, for example, the tape recorder been available at the time it first
became necessary to fix music in order to extend legal protection to it,
there is no logical reason why the visual representation of the sounding music, the score, would have been thought preferable to the
audible representation, the recording. But since visual fixation was
the earliest technology available, it became and has remained, despite
logic underscored by the realities of sound technology, the point at
which legal reasoning begins. Because of the historical sequence of
techniological development, the copyright lav still thinks of music as
something one looks at. Thus, the law gives to the owner of the visual
representation exclusive rights to control the situations under which
the music is sounded, or, in other words, exclusive right to "perform."
Such control is arguably in contravention of the basic purpose of the
Copyright Act, which is not to encourage the writing down of visual
representations of music as such, but rather, as expressed in the copyright revision bill, "[to protect] original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression... includ[ing] ... musical works
...
"11 Insofar as musical works are essentially patterns in sound, it
seems illogical to extend total control over these patterns in sound to
those who own copyright interests in only the visual representation.
The Aiken Court recognized this flaw in the Act as it stopped the
expansion of this control short of defendant Aiken's activities with
the observation that "[t]he exaction of such multiple tribute would
go far beyond what is required for the economic protection of copyright owners .... "I'll
Similarly, the second traditional understanding of the statutory
word "perform" is historically conditioned. For the entire history of
sound technology has been one of increasing its range, both in time
and space. Had, for example, CATV been available when television
broadcasting first began, there is no reason why the curvature of the
earth would have been relevant in the least to the question of "performance." For the normal range of the communication would have
been determined by the physical qualities of cable and the transmission characteristics of the atmosphere would not even have been considered. Another way of thinking about this is to return to the com115. S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (2) (1975).
116. 95 S. Ct. at 2047.
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munications system analysis. The CBS network chain in Teleprompter
could be schematized as follows:
R
-m-R/S-m-R/S-m-R/S-m-

R'

R
-m-R/S-m-R/S--m-R/S-mSENDER

-m-R/S-m-R/S-m-R/S-m-
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R
-m-R/S-m-R/S-m-R/S-m-

R
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-m-R/S-m-R/S-m-R/S-m-

R'

",,

R
Example 6
What CBS objected to was the fact that CATV's technological capabilities would cut out many of the links in the above chain, links which
had -previously paid royalties based upon the continuing existence of
all the links. Yet had CATV been available before airwave broadcasting, there is no reason to believe that CBS itself would not have
championed that technology to reach exactly the same group ,o re'ceivqrs, the television viewers. So the question arises, "Should CBS
be able to sit back, and through the 'performance' provisions of the
copyright law control the growth of ever more advanced technologies,
or should it and its affiliates be forced to be in the forefront of technological change themselves in order, through open competition, to
maintain their market position?" To this question, the Teleprompter
Court replied in essence that CBS could not stifle CATV by means of
the "performance" clause, but that it must adjust to the changed
market conditions brought about by new electronic developments.
So too, in Aiken, the Court held that the score owners' interests
must have some boundary. This position was quietly acknowledged
by ASCAP itself when it indicated that as a matter of "policy" or
"practice," it had not tried to exact licensing agreements from commercial establishments whose radios had only a single speaker, an
exaction to which they probably were entitled according to the Jewell117
LaSalle interpretation of the statutory performance clause.
117. 283 U.S. at 199.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court attempted in Aiken antd the CATV cases to
arrive at an equitable resolution of problems which arose through
the faulty conceptions underlying the Copyright Act of 1909 and which
Congress seemed unable to resolve. The Court was forced so to act
primarily because its statutory ax was not well made. Time and corresponding technological development were not primarily at fault in
causing the ax to become unusable. They did highlight graphically,
however, the inadequacy of the legal image of nonprint works of
authorship embodied in the 1909 statute. Since, unlike Congress, the
Court "must decide," it did. The result was the de facto overruling
of the traditional interpretation of "perform" as articulated in JewellLaSalle and affirmation in the field of radio of the new CATV-originated definition. To date, the new definition has been applied only to
that part of the communications spectrum between broadcaster and
viewer. The future scope of application remains to be seen.
In typical patchwork fashion, Congress has responded to the
CATV decisions with detailed provisions in the proposed copyright
revision which again serve the interests of those in control of the
old technology of air-wave broadcast. 118 So far as traditional congressional thinking is concerned, Aiken has perhaps opened another "hole
in the dike." But one would wish that Aiken might be taken as yet
another signal that rather than developing one more stopgap provision,
Congress should reexamine the whole philosophy underlying the "performance" provisions of the Copyright Act.
CHARLo=rE

D.

ROEDERER

118. S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1l1(c),(d) (1975). These sections govern the
royalties which secondary transmitters, such as CATV companies, are to pay to primary
transmitters, such a air-wave broadcasters.

